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1. Introduction
Setting out a lineal path that combs through all Maurice MerleauPonty 
works in which he speaks about childhood or about child development is 
not an easy task. Sometimes as a metaphor, other times as a concrete period 
in the individual’s genesis, the reference that the French philosopher makes 
about children often seems to go in different directions; neither opposites, 
nor excluding. Only two different views (or two alternative utilizations) 
around the features and functions of child thinking, interrelated, mutually 
nourish and complete. These two faces that allude to the parts that
together constitute a reality that overtakes them. On one side, in the texts 
more linked to psychology as Psychologie et pédagogie de l’enfant. 
Cours de Sorbonne (19491952), childhood is presented as the histo‑
rically neglected phase that shows up in the frame of phenomenology as 
a space to be vindicated; as a period with features of its own and that has
to be necessarily differentiated from other phases of development. In 
contrast, in other works, as Phenomenology of Perception or La Nature. 
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Notes Cours du Collège de France, the child acquires the image of a figure, 
of a way of being, expressing the relaunching itself of an individual in 
history. 
The childhood in the theory of MerleauPonty has not been a subject 
sufficiently explored by those who dedicate themselves to its study, 
for which the antecedents on this subject in particular are scarce. For 
Etienne Bimbenet, children’s thinking in MerleauPonty expresses “the 
phenomenological return to the things themselves, and the chronological 
return to the past of objective thought” (Bimbenet, 2002: 65). Childhood 
is then installed as a privileged moment of human development, which 
represents “a stricter proximity to nature” (ibid., 66), where objective 
thought has not yet been falsified by the arrival of adulthood. Bimbenet 
takes up the problem of child egocentrism of which Piaget speaks, to 
compare it under the light of the Cours de Sorbonne. There, the child 
lives with the certainty of being part of a plural and intersubjective world. 
Bimbenet inverts the conditions in which the discussion of childhood 
in MerleauPonty is usually involved, to make this topic not a secondary 
concern in the philosophical path of the phenomenologist, but rather as a 
relevant aspect of his theory that can shed light on the very genesis of the 
acquisition of perceptual habits. 
On the other hand, Saint Aubert analyses the “discovery” of the 
piagetian topology by MerleauPonty, from the reading of La représentation 
de l’espace chez l’enfant. Piaget describes the infantile spatiality from five 
relationships: closeness, separation (or segregation), order, involvement 
and continuity. He will argue that the evolution of the spatiality of the 
child is closely linked “to the progression of the competence of his hands 
and his exploration strategies” (Saint Aubert, 2006: 235). MerleauPonty 
will integrate this approach to the perception of the perceived world and 
of the body itself. For Saint Aubert (2006), MerleauPonty “understands 
topological space as primordial” and adds that it “is the space of ‘the thing 
itself’” invested by the body itself “as a total part” (ibid., 237). From this 
interpretation, it can be observed how MerleauPonty receives Piaget’s texts 
on spatiality as concerning the spatiality of the body itself.
In this paper, an analysis will be made on some of the works of 
MerleauPonty, in which the phenomenologist provides a description of 
childhood or the child image that reports relevant aspects to his theory. 
Childhood will not only be a methodological interest object in his 
psychology studies, but also that primal advancement of experience – the 
mere potentiality yet not thrown (or rather, having not yet been thrown) 
into the world, where everything will, necessarily, have sense.
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2. Childhood in the Cours de Sorbonne: restore the child to history
The methodological proposal presented by MerleauPonty in 
Psychologie et pédagogie de l’enfant. Cours de Sorbonne (19491952) will 
try to restore or place again the child in the sociohistorical context where it 
belongs. Just like women or “primitive people”, children should be restored 
to history and be considered acting members in historical processes that 
will confer them diverse features. For MerleauPonty, we do not have to set 
something like a “child condition”, that is, a mindset typical of the child. 
He identifies certain “originality” in the child consciousness, so setting 
features typical of childhood would be ignoring this fact and, at the same 
time, presupposing a mental structure inaccessible a priori to adults.
From this conception of scientific endeavour and spotlighting 
the epistemological consequences caused by the effacement of the 
historical particularities of the individuals, MerleauPonty considers that 
the description of the child made by the adult is the expression of the 
relationship that the latter institutes with the first, and not a naturalistic 
description of the underlying mechanisms. In Méthode en psychologie de 
l’enfant (a course of Cours de Sorbonne), the child’s consciousness is, 
primarily, opaque to the view of an adult located completely out of it. The 
philosopher criticizes certain “realistic” attempt in the childhood analysis, 
which “cuts, separates (and) distinguishes between exterior and interior, 
situation and response” (M.P., 2001: 476). There are neither organisms 
without situation, nor moments over the life of an organism where it would 
not be immersed in a determined situation. In child psychology, what 
MerleauPonty calls “atomist conception” is impossible and takes out what 
truth represents in the life of a child, since it constitutes an “immovable 
cut of what development is” in a child (ibid., 476). This discipline must 
constitute, then, “through relativity”, integrating, as subject of study, the 
child environment and the relations he is immerse in. It is necessary for 
MerleauPonty to reintegrate the child to the set of social and historical 
environment where he lives and to which he reacts; these features do 
nothing but disable the naturalistic position or “a priori” about childhood.
What are the features of childhood for the French phenomenologist? 
First, MerleauPonty speaks about child polymorphism. In the child coexist 
very diverse possibilities that make him resemble a neurotic, as long as 
multiple features inhabit in him, in a subject whose cultural root has not 
yet been defined. The child must not be conceived either as an absolute 
other or like us, but as an individual in constituting process, open to all 
possibilities offered by his environment. LeviStrauss generalizes this idea 
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by affirming, according to MerleauPonty, that “there is no child mindset, 
but a child polymorphism” (ibid., 470). When the child is not integrated 
to the culture, it could manifest conducts that may seem primitive or 
pathological. The physical and intellectual developments of a child are 
not the only factors conditioning his access to the world of culture, but 
also his imitative abilities utilized to “copy” adult’s conducts; the child 
acquires habits proper of his group using “quasidramatic means” (ibid., 
468) of imitation. Polymorphism refers to the merleaupontian negative of 
“crystallizing” the child, conferring immovable attributes. Many of them, 
he affirms, are nothing but the result of the historical path and upbringing 
received by women throughout time. At first, libido has nothing to do 
with sexual instinct, but will call “sexual” to these first conducts since 
they are related to the difference of sexes, without knowledge of genital 
mechanism. Sexuality comes in the life of a child as anticipation. The 
libido circulating by different ways in the child psychosexual development 
is not necessarily meant to acquire a sexual significance. The initial libido, 
according to MerleauPonty, “should be undetermined” (ibid., 333), given 
that all individuals are polymorph perverse. Libido indeterminacy (that 
will take a more precise path with the castration produced by the closure 
of the Oedipus complex) is one of the notes that could define the nature 
interrogative and open to a future, described by MerleauPonty. 
Second, the prematuring phenomenon (ibid., 470) refers to the 
possibility of the child of living the conflicts or certain episodes of his life, 
before the development of the physical or intellectual powers required to 
do so. From the beginning, the child possesses a determined culture, since 
he starts at a very early stage to have a relation with his peers as of the 
intervention of cultural objects and institutions. The utilization of certain 
utensils (as the baby bottle during the lactation period) or the adaptation 
to socially regulated behaviors (such as breastfeeding, which features vary 
from one social group to other), give account of the insertion of the child 
into a particular culture, with which he will interact and build determined 
standards of the “usual” or ordinary. The sleep cycle2 (another phenomenon 
that is many times considered as merely “natural” or biological) is nothing 
but the ordering of the sleeping and waking periods in the heart of a 
determined culture.
Finally, the identification relation, established between the child and 
the caretaker adult. For MerleauPonty, the child sees himself in the other, 
2 See: MerleauPonty, M. (1995). La nature. Cours du collège de France, p. 196.
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as much as the others see themselves in him. This identification relation 
creates tension between its participants; typical tension between who is the 
“model” and who cannot adapt to it. MerleauPonty distinguishes a double 
imitation phenomenon: on one hand, from the children to their caretakers 
(for whom adult age represent a sort of “perfection”) idealized as that 
moment when they will be able to do what they want; and on the other 
hand, there is an identification from the parents to the children as they 
revive their childhood by taking care of their sons or daughters. The double 
identification phenomenon between the child and the adult subscribes the 
methodological starting point of MerleauPonty, in which the child cannot 
be defined a priori of his social, historical and cultural environment. This 
double identification implies an idealization of the other’s lived moment: 
for the children, adulthood is the moment of continuous joy, of perfection, 
when all problems disappear; in contrast, adults (MerleauPonty refers to 
the mother in particular) revive their own childhood with the children.
3. The original interlacing: the child as a place inhabited by many 
places
The world opens up in front of the child’s view in a different way 
from that of the adults. A body still being built, pushing to be split off 
from the body of the caretakers and the exit of Oedipus complex, partially 
closes to give way to other transformations. The discussion is announced in 
Phenomenology of Perception) to be extended in Psychologie et pédagogie 
de l’enfant. Cours de Sorbonne (19491952), reporting about the relevancy 
of the child figure and what revelations his perceptive faculties will have 
for the French philosopher.
In Phenomenology of perception, MerleauPonty states that the child 
lives in a world equally accessible for all, where there is no difference 
between his perspective and the one of those around him; the child “has 
no awareness of himself, nor of others, as private subjectivities, does not 
suspect we all are, and he is, limited to a certain point of view about the 
world” (M.P., 1984: 366). This undifferentiation of the points of view is 
nothing but a mention of the indiscernible nature of corporeality in early 
childhood. These unclear boundaries express the plasticity of the corporeal 
scheme, including within its boundaries, the body of their primary caretakers 
itself. This first mention of infantile subjectivity as full openness to others 
and as a dimension crossed by the environment will have a meaning, above 
all political, which will become flesh in a call to return to that openness 
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towards others from which adulthood seems to distance us. In this way, it 
returns us to that first state where we do not exclude the other but transform 
it into a constitutive part of our being. About this, MerleauPonty states: 
Actually, it is necessary that, in a way, children are right against adults or 
against Piaget, and barbaric thoughts or first childhood continue being an 
indispensable capital below the adults. (….) With cogito begins the fight of 
consciousness where each one, as Hegel says, pursues the death of the other. 
For the fight to begin, for each consciousness could suspect the alien presences 
that denies, it is necessary they have a common ground and they remember 
their peaceful coexistence in the child’s world. (ibid., 366)
The child is this omniscient individual that seems to embrace 
all possible perspectives and, in turn, is traversed by them. In one of 
MerleauPonty examples, the child believes that his dreams are accessible 
by everyone sleeping in the room. The world for the child is “the vague 
place of all experiences”, embracing from true objects to “individual and 
instantaneous ghosts” (ibid., 356). The distinction of different perspectives 
and points of view experienced by adults, is not a real problem for 
children, who are still immerse in the peace brought by the syncretism 
typical of a scheme that has not yet consolidated. The child “does not have 
the science of points of view” (ibid., 366), since he still does not note that 
each individual thought is private, and we can only have access to them (or 
to part of them) by the exteriorizations made by them. Simultaneously, the 
world and everything happening within are for the child, in MerleauPonty’s 
words, “quasimaterial” to the point that “a child asks himself why looks, 
when crossing, do not break” (M.P., 2001: 366). In taking Piaget’s theory, 
it is around the age of twelve when the child would reach rational thinking; 
thus, discovering himself “as sensitive consciousness and intellectual 
consciousness, as point of view about the world and as call to overcome 
this point of view, to build an objectivity at the level of judgement” (M.P., 
1984: 366). The “truths of rationalism” appear with all their weight. For 
MerleauPonty, Piaget makes the mistake of thinking about childhood as a 
degraded adulthood, as the place of chaos and nonsense. Also, that at the 
age of twelve the rational thinking comes and with it, all contradictions 
disappear. Facing this idea, MerleauPonty retrieves the “barbaric thinking” 
of the child, who remains in the happy coexistence with other thinking, 
without struggling to eliminate them. With the coming of rational thinking 
the fight begins, where every consciousness pursues the “death of the other” 
(M.P., 2001: 367). For this fight to occur the individual must, according 
to MerleauPonty, remember the first phase of indiscernibility where all 
consciousnesses were part of a common ground.
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In Phenomenology of perception, MerleauPonty clearly describes 
the dynamic from which the child makes a way among the world spectacle 
to start ordering it. In that beginning still mute, the child finds himself 
lost in the vastness of sensations opening in front of his eyes, and in that 
pure possibility of discovery. It is presented as the privileged beholder of a 
world still not restricted by the boundaries of the senses:
It is true that, often, other’s knowledge clarifies our knowledge: the outer 
spectacle reveals to the child the sense of his own impulses, since it proposes 
an aim. But the example would pass unnoticed if it doesn’t run into the child’s 
inner possibilities (….) The communication or the understanding of gestures is 
achieved with the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my 
gestures and of the intentions, legible in other’s behaviour. (M.P., 1984: 202)
The quoted fragment references to a passage of Henri Wallon (one 
of the most recurrent backgrounds in MerleauPonty’s work), who in 
Kinesthesia and the Visual Body Image in the Child3 uses a quote of Karl 
Marx to report the dialectic and intersubjective constitution of the body of 
the child:
Man begins to reflect himself in another man as in a mirror. Only when he 
has, in front of the individual Paul, a similar behavior he has in front of him, 
the individual Peter begins to be aware of him as a man. This quote of Marx 
expresses very well this fluctuation from him to other and of the perceived 
image in other in him, which is not only a moral or social reality, but also an 
essential psychological process. (Calmels, 2000: 61) 
This phrase, with clear political and moral connotations, is taken by 
Wallon as the dynamic itself of subjectivity autoconstruction from the body 
of the others. We exist amid that constant dialog with our environment 
with which we establish, from the very beginning, a tonic and emotional 
dialogue, based on the changes of muscle tone, interchange that satisfies 
the postural needs of the baby when getting from an adult the first postures 
in the act of giving. This is postulated as the possibility condition (along 
with the satisfaction of the biological basic needs of the baby) in the 
construction of every individual. Then, the dialectic is, for Wallon, the 
dynamic that structures and defines the subjectivity of the baby and will 
rise for MerleauPonty in the dynamic itself of the being in the world. 
3 See: Wallon, Henri (1965). “Kinestesia e imagen visual del propio cuerpo en el niño”, 
Estudios sobre psicología genética de la personalidad, Buenos Aires: Lautaro. 
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4. Opening towards expression: the child as primary silence
For MerleauPonty, “all those who transform into words a certain 
silence” (ibid., 201), this is, the child that is learning to talk and the writer, 
are giving an account of the contingent of the human communication. 
The child owns that contingency, manipulates it, makes a fruitful use of 
it and adapts it to his needs when referring to the things of the world. The 
“primary silence” from which everything could be born, expresses the pure 
communicative potentiality of the child, that capacity of being able to refer, 
even to those that disappear in adulthood. They can create communicative 
situations in the middle of silence, interpret sounds as constituents of a 
communicative process or reading in them a missing musicality. This point 
is addressed by MerleauPonty in the section “The perception of the other 
and the dialogue” in La prose du monde, where he will try to recover that 
first word, the conqueror word (parole conquérante), that will enable the 
language from the significant potentiality of the gesture. 
In communication, we are never in the passive subject role: when 
I talk, it will be in the middle of the interchange with another individual; 
and when I listen too, since I will talk later. “As speaking subjects, we 
continue, resume a single effort, older than us, where we are integrated one 
and the other”, so the word will not be other than this “anticipation and 
resumption” (M.P., 1971: 200), as long as “the acquired significances” will 
contain the new ones as a “trace or horizon” (ibid., 183). Likewise, the style 
of the expression that will cover the words that have been said or the words 
in a book, cause “the general environment of interpreting” (ibid., 184) the 
world they refer to. In Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, 
MerleauPonty states “that the perceived world (…) already implies the 
expressive function” (ibid., 45). In these courses, the phenomenologist 
deepens the linking between the act of perceiving and expression, dynamic 
identified in the circularity of the function of the perceived word, whose 
perception will remain as sediment to grasp the world that contains it 
and will be the trace from which the new worlds could open. Then, the 
expression will be defined by the philosopher like “the property that a 
phenomenon has, by its inner agency, to make other (phenomenon) known, 
that was not or even never has been given” (ibid., 48). For this reason, 
“the function of expression (parole) itself” is described by him as “the 
power of saying overall more than what it says word by word” (ibid., 182). 
The episode narrated by MerleauPonty in Phenomenology of perception 
(1984), about a child with his grandmother at the bed story time, could 
illustrate this fact: the story, daily told by his grandmother in a determined 
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situation and using certain objects to do it (her glasses, the book arranged in 
a specific way, etc.) magically “appears” for the child when that narrative 
situation is rebuilt. The narration begins to be told when the situation that 
facilitates it is arranged. “The story is a world and it has to be a way of 
making it magically appear putting on glasses and leaning into a book” 
(M.P., 1984: 410). This way, language will make sense for a child when 
he could link it to a particular situation, and until then, the situatedness of 
experience will be something indefinite, unable to evoke anything. Then, 
the word spoken (or the use of it), will be the vehicle of that operation by 
which a world will open from the horizon of significance that underlies it. 
This way, in Phenomenology of perception (1984), the child is presented 
as the beginning itself of the cogito that is fulfilled in the moment it is 
expressed and as the beginning of the human being, unitized and split from 
other that always seems to mix with his body. “Even as thinking subject”, 
states MerleauPonty, “I am still this first perception, the sequence of life 
itself that this (perception) will open” (ibid., 416). This first “vision” waits 
to “be set and explicated by perceptive exploration and word” (ibid., 413). 
Equally, the expressive world of the child offers us other aspects of 
the act of expressing itself, where the aesthetic dimension crosses, like in 
the artist, with the temporal dimension. We are immersed, MerleauPonty 
states, in the “objectivist illusion” according to which “the act of expressing, 
in its regular or essential way, consists, given a significance, in building a 
system of signs in a way that each element of the significance corresponds 
to an element of the significant, this is, to represent” (M.P., 1971: 205). The 
planimetric perspective intends to offer a “notation of the world that would 
be applicable for all”, from which “the lived perspective is set” and whilst 
it builds and image that could be translated as any other point of view, “it 
is the image of a world in itself” (ibid., 207). The “deformation” of this 
kind of perspective produce is “systematic” and applies to all elements of 
drawing, it produces the illusion of seeing things from “the knowledge that 
may have of a human vision a God that does not immerse in finitude” (ibid., 
207). The child’s drawing, instead, expresses another way of approaching 
our environment, no longer from this attempt of grabbing a universal point 
of view, but our relationship with the world. Also, it does not try to rebuild, 
for MerleauPonty, an objective point of view, but to point out our contact 
with things, as they call us in a way. The child expression proposes us 
a way of “elliptic” expression, according to which, when a determined 
spectacle is represented, all things that intervene in it are invoked, placing 
them in a same level of coexistence. “All the elements of the spectacle are 
pointed out without error and without overlapping.” (ibid., 206) In child 
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drawing, the presence of our body in the world is revealed by “the mark of 
our finitude” and “the secret substance of the object.” (ibid., 209) Children 
put all the parts of a story at the same level, this is, all moments, actions and 
characters involved in a story are summoned in a single image. Children 
conjugate the evolution of a story in a single level, that connects them 
and make the relations between its parts visible. Far from “the reasonable 
‘adult’, who thinks about time as a series of overlapped temporary spots” 
(ibid., 209), the child puts us facing the temporal plexus itself, facing the 
elliptic dynamic of the lived time where the present refers us, like a beam, 
to the past and to the future. 
Child temporality, remaining as background in the children’s drawing 
analysis, will be another relevant point that MerleauPonty will take from 
the theory of Piaget: if we analyse the way in which children experience 
time, it could be observed the cultural nature of this dimension. Perception 
is defined by MerleauPonty as “a machine of living” the time (ibid., 190), 
from which temporality is given to us as a cultural setting. He also adds 
that: “My body is not only an apparatus of making attachments in space”, 
but it will also make attachments in time” (ibid., 190). Time will be, in 
the end, what organizes, to some extent, the perceptive field (champ). The 
child, in the still fluctuating construction of his own past, gives account 
of the conventional and cultural nature of the “time marking machines”. 
The “yesterday” which are months in the younger, or the “tomorrow” that 
will be in several days, render account of that, of an episodic disorder that 
contacts us with an experience not yet ordered by a cultural setting.
5.  The birth as institution: opening of a field of experience
With the arrival of a child, a new story begins, a new record of 
experience opens facing our body; the whole environment resignifies and, 
with that, the story of who take part of this new sense opening also acquires 
a new signification. Besides, a new “record” is opened, a new story “is 
founded”. With the birth, a “new possibility of situation” is opened (M.P., 
1984: 415) that it cannot be considered merely as an objective fact between 
others, but it is linked to the past and to the perspectives of a future. To 
the phenomenologist, birth compromises a future while it sets up as a 
situation which will necessarily have an outcome. With the arrival of a 
child, “the world received a new level of significance” (ibid., 415), in 
which the objective space acquires a different significance: the windows of 
the building, which in the past were only sources of light and a space for 
contact with the outside world, turn into dangerous spaces that should be 
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away from the newcomer; a certain outfit is covered with the veil of some 
memory related to the child’s birth; a room will be the actual place of the 
beginning of the family. About this, MerleauPonty supports:
In the house where a child is born, all the objects change their sense, they 
expect from him an undetermined treatment yet, someone else, someone 
different is there, a new story, short or long, was just founded, a new record, 
was just opened. (ibid., 416)
This new look that is opened with the birth itself is pure institution, 
given that it opens a new record of substitution that will impregnate with 
a certain sense the course of the child’s experiences. In The institution 
in the personal and public history (2012), birth appears as an instituting 
or sense giving event, from which other events will have a determined 
significance. First, let’s remember the definition of institution developed 
by MerleauPonty:
[it means] setting in an experience (or in a built apparatus) of dimensions (in 
the general Cartesian sense: system of reference) in relation to which a whole 
series of other experiences will make sense and form a continuation, a story. 
(M.P., 2012: 8)
However, for whom is an institution the event of birth? In the 
courses about institution, birth seems to be another instituting event in 
the life of an individual, like the Oedipus complex during childhood or 
falling in love during adolescence. In Phenomenology of perception, the 
ambivalent nature of this event is expressed, where the link itself of the 
individuals in the world and the overlapping and resignifying of personal 
stories between each other could be seen. Birth is not only a sense giving 
event for the individual that arrives to the world, but also for all the 
ones taking part of his experience environment. Likewise, in La Nature. 
Notes Cours du Collège de France, the child is for MerleauPonty a “new 
field” of consciousness (M.P., 1995: 271), not emerged from his mother’s 
consciousness, but of the “emptiness disposition”, because of “irruption 
of a new field coming from the interworld (entremonde)”,4 which is not an 
effect of the predecessors, although at the beginning it depends entirely on 
them. There is not a “stickiness of souls” between the mother and the child. 
About that, MerleauPonty says:
4 The Entremonde refers to the existence of a “world” (environment or group) within 
other. 
74 Jesica Estefania Buffane
It is a body that produces the stickiness and that perceives when the actions 
of the world reach him. There is no descent of a soul in a body, but rather an 
emergence of a life in his cradle, caused vision. (ibid.,  280)
This way, the coming to the world of a baby is considered by the 
philosopher as opening to a new experience, but at the same time, as a new 
sense courses within the experience of the others. Birth is the overlapping 
or linking (empiètement) about which MerleauPonty will elaborate, in 
La prose du monde, according to which the identification of the other is 
produced in the world itself, in the crossing of the corporeality and moving 
possibilities with the others. With birth, the individual starts to take part of 
a determined vital tissue; it is pure sense relaunch, from the others and in 
between them.
1. Conclusion
The child appears in MerleauPonty’s phenomenology not only 
as the subject of study of psychology (elusive, complex, opaque to the 
view of the adult), but also as an image quasimetaphoric of the genesis 
of the perceptual act itself; the pristine and ideal stage of the corporeal 
organization of an individual that seems to arrive to this world only with 
few tools that determine his openness. Childhood, then, is not only a period 
of psychogenetic development of an individual, but also a quasiliterary 
figure, poetic, that places us in the beginning of the dynamic of being 
thrown in the world. The child is the image of that field, full of peace, where 
all views cross without touching each other. Reflection of the plexus of 
possibilities that open in the perception event, the child is the world itself, 
since all possibilities of the individual are not yet a realized fit. Childhood 
as a representative image of the wild experience hidden by the halo of 
scientificism and as a concrete phase in the psychophysical development 
of an individual, will prompt to, in the work of the philosopher, a new 
conception of human subjectivity, crossed by the world and in constant 
dialog with it. The child relaunches itself to sense within his own story, 
the beginning of accumulation of significances that link with the ones 
that surround him and that will acquire, from there, a new sense. He is 
the beginning, the pristine phase of sedimentation dynamic that will later 
replicate in the story itself. It is the incarnated and alive expression that 
shows us the link we have with others and which we constantly avoid; it is 
the time that expresses itself and that finds in the not yet articulated space, 
without mediation of conventional representations, a place to shelter.
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The child described in Psychologie et pédagogie de l’enfant. 
Cours de Sorbonne (19491952), is a child completely permeated by the 
environment that receives him: even those behaviours we consider natural 
are mediated by culture. Functions like feeding or Oedipus complex are, 
in the heart of this courses, a sample of a determined group or community, 
and not universal phenomena that replicate in the same way in dissimilar 
places. In La nature. Cours du collège de France, MerleauPonty takes the 
experiences of Gesell,5 to explore the ambivalence of the body between 
the worlds of nature and culture. For Gesell, the animal body is defined 
as a “take” (prise) or occupation of the outer world, therefore there will 
be no difference between the body itself and the behaviour, “because the 
body is defined as a place of behaviour” (M.P., 1995: 196). In the case of 
a premature baby, analysed by Gesell, he describes how the sleep cycle, 
altered in the beginning, is “acquired”, “as if the child has learned the 
sleeping talent” (ibid., 196). MerleauPonty affirms that sleeping at night 
and being awake during the day are completely social events. However, 
the existence of continuous periods of sleep (or, rather, the need of them) 
is a completely organic event and will be the organic maturity that will 
allow us distinguish between one period and the other. This event will be, 
for Gesell, a determination or reliability (sûreté) factor for the organism. 
Likewise, MerleauPonty raises the perception of geometric forms 
both in adults and in children. The perception of both, he affirms, differs 
remarkably, particularly in the recognition and discrimination of some 
features of the figure. The circle is the figure originated by the rotation of a 
segment of a line around a point. The question MerleauPonty makes himself 
is how it is operated – this conversion by which it goes from the perceived 
structure to the significance or the intelligible form. “The structure”, he 
declares, “is stuck with the significance provided by the science”, and “in 
the perceived circle (…) the whole is not independent from the sensitive 
ipseity”; “it is the science that releases significance” (ibid., 204). In the 
naïf perceptive experience, the whole does not transcend the parts that 
conforms it. This is why even though adults cannot prevent identifying 
a centre within the circle, children do not have the same approach to the 
figure. Science has not yet printed its divisions, descriptions and concepts 
in the child’s perceptive act. This irruption of the science over the act of 
5 The work referred in the section is The embriology of behavior that Gesell wrote in col‑
laboration with Catherine Amatruda. See: Gesell, A., Amatruda, C. (1953), L’embryo-
logie du comportement : les débuts de la pensée humaine, Paris,  Presses universitaire 
de France. 
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perception itself, on the way we have of assessing, arranging and referring 
to the world, will be the background of the dialog that MerleauPonty will 
develop in The world of perception. Seven Conferences. In these radio 
conferences about perception, the childhood is that place where the biased 
vision of the modern science has not yet arrived. The child, same as the 
insane or the primitive, are the wild movement, indomitable, that just 
like in art, guards us from the universal view of scientificism that erases, 
with its uniformity impetus, the richness of an environment that provokes 
different (even opposite) views. Within the description of the world made 
by MerleauPonty, the child and the artist –as relevant figures that enrich 
the way we refer to our environment– come to rescue the colors that are 
released from a scent, the different tones of a melody and the time that 
drains in a landscape. 
At the end, in works like Phenomenology of perception, the child 
is the image of full openness, of “going towards” characteristic of all 
individuals. The child is the significant potentiality that searches the sense 
among the others and that it is immerse in the pacific syncretism of the 
bodies that surround him. The harmony in which the children live from 
this lack of individuation (not only applied to the corporeality, but also 
to the thinking), make childhood an ideal of conviviality, a quasipolitical 
figure, diluted with the arrival of adolescence. The child is potentiality 
and, foremostly, a stronghold of wild thinking with which adulthood does 
nothing but forget, making an effort, with the entrance to rational thinking, 
to destroy.
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ABSTRACT
This paper explores some of the works of Maurice MerleauPonty, in which 
the phenomenologist provides a description of childhood or the child image that 
reports relevant aspects to his theory. The description of ‘childhood’ as a place 
inhabited by many places, as a primary silence or as that unspeakable, shows 
us childhood as the opening of a new field of experience and the institution of 
a new sense. Childhood will not only be a methodological object of interest in 
his psychology studies, but also a primal advancement of experience – the mere 
potentiality yet not thrown (or rather, having not yet been thrown) into the world 
where everything will, necessarily, have sense. 
Keywords: MerleauPonty – childhood – expression – sense – perception 
RESUMO
Este artigo explora algumas das obras de Maurice Merleau Ponty, nas quais 
o fenomenólogo fornece uma descrição da infância ou da imagem da criança que 
relata aspectos relevantes para sua teoria. A descrição da “infância” como um lugar 
habitado por muitos lugares, como um silêncio primário ou indizível, mostra‑nos 
a infância como a abertura de um novo campo da experiência e a instituição de 
um novo sentido. A infância não será apenas um objeto metodológico de interesse 
nos seus estudos de psicologia, mas também um prenúncio primário primordial 
da experiência – a mera potencialidade ainda não lançada (ou melhor, ainda não 
jogada) no mundo onde tudo terá necessariamente sentido.
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